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SUMMARY TABLE 
 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Output (Real Annual Growth %)      
Private Consumer Expenditure 5.2 3.0 3.4 2.7 2.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 3.6 3.9 4.4 4.2 3.6 
Investment 50.8 -6.8 -21.1 45.1 4.6 
Exports 4.1 9.2 10.4 8.8 6.3 
Imports 18.4 1.1 -2.9 20.3 7.3 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 3.7 8.1 8.2 4.9 3.1 
Gross National Product (GNP) 9.7 5.2 6.5 4.1 2.6 
      
Prices (Annual Growth %)      
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 0.0 0.3 0.5 1.1 1.4 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings 2.5 3.4 3.0 4.2 4.5 
      
Labour Market      
Employment Levels (ILO basis (‘000)) 2,132 2,194 2,258 2,305 2,348 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (‘000)) 195 158 137 129 123 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 8.4 6.7 5.8 5.1 5.0 
      
Public Finance      
General Government Balance (€bn) -1.8 -0.8 0.0 0.0 1.0 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -0.7 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 
General Government Debt (% of GDP) 73.9 67.8 63.6 58.8 53.9 
      
External Trade      
Balance of Payments Current Account (€bn) -11.4 1.5 29.0 -6.6 -10.6 
Current Account (% of GNP) -5.2 0.6 11.5 -2.4 -3.8 
 
Note:  Detailed forecast tables are contained in an Appendix to this Commentary. 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2018 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 101.6 107.0 5.3 1.8 3.4 
Public Net Current Expenditure 29.6 32.1 8.7 4.0 4.4 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 93.2 75.9 -18.6 3.1 -21.1 
Exports of Goods and Services 359.7 396.4 10.2 -0.2 10.4 
Physical Changes in Stocks 6.1 1.2 
   Final Demand 590.1 612.5 3.8 0.8 3.0 
less: 
     
Imports of Goods and Services  294.0 289.0 -1.7 1.2 -2.9 
Statistical Discrepancy 1.1 0.5 
   
GDP at Market Prices 296.1 323.5 9.3 0.4 8.8 
Net Factor Payments  -62.3 -71.0 
   
GNP at Market Prices 234.9 253.1 7.7 1.2 6.5 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture, Self Employed Income 3.5 3.0 -0.5 -15.4 
Agriculture, Employee Remunerations 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 
Non-Agriculture, Employee Remunerations 87.4 92.6 5.1 5.9 
Other 113.3 119.4 6.1 5.4 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.1 0.3   
Statistical Discrepancy -2.8 -3.2 
  
Net Domestic Product 252.5 273.7 21.2 8.4 
Net Factor Payments -62.3 -71.0 -8.7 14.0 
National Income 190.2 202.7 12.5 6.6 
Depreciation 73.1 79.3 6.2 8.5 
GNP at Factor Cost 263.3 282.0 18.7 7.1 
Taxes less Subsidies -28.4 -28.9 -0.5 1.8 
GNP at Market Prices 234.9 253.1 18.2 7.7 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
  
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 65.6 99.5 33.8 
F -61.1 -65.4 -4.3 
Net Transfers -3.1 -5.1 -2.0   
Balance on Current Account 1.5 29.0 27.5 
as % of GNP 0.6 11.5 10.9 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2019 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2018 2019 Change in 2019 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 107.0 111.8 4.5 1.8 2.7 
Public Net Current Expenditure 32.1 34.8 8.5 4.1 4.2 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 75.9 113.4 49.4 3.0 45.1 
Exports of Goods and Services 396.4 438.0 10.5 1.5 8.8 
Physical Changes in Stocks 1.2 3.0    
Final Demand 612.5 701.1 14.5 2.1 12.1 
less:      
Imports of Goods and Services 289.0 352.2 21.9 1.3 20.3 
Statistical Discrepancy 0.5 -0.1    
GDP at Market Prices 323.5 348.9 7.8 2.8 4.9 
Net Factor Payments -71.0 -77.6    
GNP at Market Prices 253.1 271.2 7.2 2.9 4.1 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2018 2019 Change in 2019 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture Self-Emp. Income 3.0 3.9 0.9 31.9 
Agriculture, Employee Remuneration 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 
Non-Agriculture, Employee Remunerations 92.6 99.2 6.6 7.1 
Other 119.4 122.6 3.2 2.7 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.3 0.2     
Statistical Discrepancy -3.2 -3.2 0.0   
Net Domestic Product 273.7 296.0 22.3 8.1 
Net Factor Payments -71.0 -77.6 -6.7 9.4 
National Income 202.7 218.3 15.6 7.7 
Depreciation 79.3 82.1 2.9 3.6 
GNP at factor cost 282.0 300.5 18.5 6.5 
Taxes less Subsidies -28.9 -29.3 -0.4 1.2 
GNP at Market Prices 253.1 271.2 18.1 7.2 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
2018 2019 Change in 2019 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X - M 99.5 76.7 -22.8 
F -65.4 -77.6 -12.3 
Net Transfers -5.1 -5.6 -0.6 
Balance on Current Account 29.0 -6.6 -35.6 
as % of GNP 11.5 -2.4 -13.1 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2020 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
  2019 2020 Change in 2020 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 111.8 116.8 4.4 1.9 2.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 34.8 35.6 2.1 -1.4 3.6 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 113.4 122.0 7.6 2.9 4.6 
Exports of Goods and Services 438.0 472.1 7.8 1.4 6.3 
Physical Changes in Stocks 3.0 3.0    
Final Demand 701.1 749.5 6.9 1.6 5.3 
less:        
Imports of Goods and Services 352.2 384.2 9.1 1.6 7.3 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.1 -0.1    
GDP at Market Prices 348.9 365.2 4.7 1.5 3.1 
Net Factor Payments -77.6 -82.8    
GNP at Market Prices 271.2 282.4 4.1 1.5 2.6 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2019 2020 Change in 2020 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture Self-Emp. Income 3.9 4.0 0.1 2.6 
Agriculture, Employee Remuneration 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 
Non-Agriculture, Employee Remunerations 99.2 105.5 6.4 6.4 
Other 122.6 126.9 4.2 3.5 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.2 0.2     
Statistical Discrepancy -3.2 -3.2 0.0   
Net Domestic Product 296.0 310.4 14.4 4.9 
Net Factor Payments -77.6 -82.8 -5.1 6.6 
National Income 218.3 227.6 9.3 4.2 
Depreciation 82.1 84.9 2.8 3.4 
GNP at factor cost 300.5 312.5 12.1 4.0 
Taxes less Subsidies -29.3 -30.1 -0.8 2.9 
GNP at Market Prices 271.2 282.4 11.2 4.1 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
2019 2020 Change in 2020 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X - M 76.7 78.3 1.6 
F -77.6 -82.8 -5.1 
Net Transfers -5.6 -6.1 -0.5 
Balance on Current Account -6.6 -10.6 -4.0 
as % of GNP -2.4 -3.8 -1.4 
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The Irish Economy – Forecast Overview 
 
Although the Irish economy continues to perform in a robust manner, a number 
of considerations arise given the present growth performance. Firstly, due to 
certain multinational related activities, a divergence is likely once again between 
headline and underlying output growth for the present year. While we are 
revising upwards our forecast of headline GDP to just less than 5 per cent for 
2019, certain underlying data would suggest the growth outlook has moderated 
somewhat as we move through the present year. Secondly, a number of 
significant international related risks are on the horizon for the Irish economy. As 
with previous Commentaries, our forecasts, unless otherwise stated, are subject 
to the technical assumption that the United Kingdom remains part of the 
European Union. 
 
From an international perspective the deterioration in the outlook for many of 
our main trading partners is a concern and suggests that external sources of 
growth may be somewhat diminished in 2020. A further source of uncertainty is 
the nature of the UK’s proposed exit from the European Union. This has particular 
complications for the domestic budgetary process given the UK Government’s 
insistence on leaving the European Union by the end of October irrespective of 
whether an agreement has been reached. Under our baseline outlook, we believe 
the economy will grow by over 3 per cent in 2020; however if a No-Deal Brexit 
were to materialise in late 2019, output growth could dissipate entirely next year. 
Indeed, it is not inconceivable that the Irish economy could contract in 2020 
under such a scenario. 
 
This means that the most appropriate budgetary stance may vary significantly 
depending on the Brexit process. If the domestic economy continues to perform 
strongly into 2020 then a mildly contractionary budget is advisable to reduce the 
possibility of overheating. If the Brexit issue is resolved satisfactorily from an Irish 
perspective, then the Irish economy may face increased overheating pressures. 
However, if the nature of Brexit results in a significant and adverse shock for the 
domestic economy then a stimulatory budget may be required. 
 
The recent figures for housing completions suggest that the increase in the 
number of new houses has slowed somewhat. Furthermore, the rate of house 
price inflation has also slowed, particularly in the capital. Some have suggested 
that the associated issues with house price affordability should give rise to 
changes in the manner in which the Central Bank of Ireland’s macro-prudential 
policy is implemented. However, it is imperative that these measures are 
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maintained in such a manner to prevent the emergence of another house price-
mortgage credit feedback loop. It is important that we do not forget the 
significant domestic policy failures which preceded the financial crisis of 
2007/2008. 
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The International Economy 
 
The international economy section has now been amended to also include a 
section on international financial developments. This has previously been in the 
Monetary and Financial section. Therefore, the section now deals initially with 
the overall performance of the domestic economy’s main trading partners, then 
international financial developments, and finally the implications for the traded 
sector of the domestic economy. 
 
Global growth looks set to remain subdued with the outlook for a number of 
major economies continuing to deteriorate. In the United States an increasing 
number of indicators, including the inverted yield curve and declining Purchasing 
Managers’ Index are pointing towards a potential recession. In Europe the 
economic outlook is also deteriorating, with a recession looming in Germany and 
an increasing probability of a ‘No-Deal Brexit’. In the midst of a trade war with the 
US, the Chinese economy is beginning to slow down, with some forecasters 
projecting growth to fall below 6 per cent in 2020. Against this backdrop, in the 
July update of its World Economic Outlook, the IMF revised down its forecast for 
global growth to 3.2 per cent in 2019 and 3.5 per cent in 2020.1 From an Irish 
perspective, a slowdown in the growth rates of major economies around the 
world suggests a weakening of global demand for exports which in turn will have 
a negative impact on Irish growth. 
 
Economic activity in the European Union has continued to slow in 2019. Though 
there was a slight pick-up in the growth rate in Q1, flash estimates of annual 
growth show the growth rate falling to 1.3 per cent in Q2 2019. In the Euro Area 
the growth rate is even lower at 1.1 per cent with growth especially subdued in 
the major European economies. In Germany, France and Italy real GDP growth in 
Q2 2019 fell to 0.4, 1.4 and -0.1 per cent respectively. Figure 1 illustrates that the 
main reason for the declining growth rate in GDP has been the weak performance 
of exports and a decline in private consumption. As of June 2019 the 
unemployment rate in the EU stood at 6.3 per cent, the same rate as the previous 
month and 0.5 percentage points lower than June 2018. Inflation in the Euro Area 
averaged 1 per cent in July 2019, down from 1.3 per cent in June and the lowest 
rate of inflation in the currency bloc since November 2016. 
 
 
                                                          
 
1  International Monetary Fund (2019). World Economic Outlook: Update, Precarious Recovery, Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund, July 2019. 
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FIGURE 1 EU28 – CONTRIBUTIONS TO YEAR-ON-YEAR GDP GROWTH (P.P.) 
 
 
Sources:  Eurostat, GDP and main components. 
 
The annual growth rate of real GDP in the UK declined significantly in Q2 2019 
compared to the previous quarter. While it is likely that the strong growth rate in 
Q1 2019 can be attributed to stockpile accumulation in anticipation of Brexit and 
that a drop off in the growth rate in Q2 was likely to occur, the low growth rate of 
0.6 per cent is still concerning. This is the joint lowest annual growth rate in a 
quarter since Q2 2012, an ominous sign for the UK in the face of so much 
domestic and international uncertainty. The weak performance of the UK can also 
be seen in the poor performance of the production and manufacturing sectors 
over this period. On an annual basis, production declined by 0.5 per cent in  
Q2 2019 while manufacturing declined by 1 per cent over the same period. 
Nevertheless, the UK labour market has been robust over this period with the 
unemployment rate remaining below 4 per cent throughout 2019. This has put 
upward pressure on labour costs with weekly earnings rising by 3.7 per cent 
annually in June 2019, the highest rate of growth since before the financial crisis. 
However, as the value of the pound continues to tumble, the price of imports into 
the UK will increase, which may erode the benefit of increased earnings to 
workers and exert further higher production costs on UK businesses.  
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FIGURE 2 UK GDP (LHS), UK PRODUCTION AND MANUFACTURING (RHS), Y-ON-Y CHANGE (%) 
 
 
Source:  Office for National Statistics 
 
The US economy grew at an annual rate of 2.0 per cent in Q2 2019, down from 
3.1 per cent in the previous quarter. Though private consumption expenditure 
was strong over this period, increasing by 2.6 per cent, this was offset somewhat 
by a fall in the level of exports, which declined by 1.7 per cent. The US labour 
market continues to perform strongly with the unemployment rate standing at 
3.7 per cent in July 2019. Despite this, the warning signs for a potential 
contraction in the US economy are mounting. These include falling corporate 
earnings estimates, the inverted yield curve on US Treasuries and weakening PMI 
in manufacturing, which as of August 2019 experienced negative growth.  
 
The aforementioned fall in US exports can partially be explained by the decline in 
exports to China. Figure 3 highlights a significant deterioration in bilateral trade 
between the two countries. In Q2 2019 the US exported 18 per cent fewer goods 
to China compared to the same period the previous year and imported nearly  
11 per cent less. With no sign of a de-escalation in trade tensions, there is likely 
to be further deterioration in trade between the two countries going forward.  
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FIGURE 3 US-CHINA SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, Y-O-Y GROWTH (%) 
 
 
Source:  United States Census Bureau, US Export and Import data for goods. 
 
Real GDP growth in China decreased to 6.2 per cent in Q2 2019, down from  
6.4 per cent the previous period. This is a continuation of the downward trend in 
Chinese growth that started in 2009. While a deceleration in growth is to be 
expected from a country that has experienced such rapid expansion over the last 
number of decades, the escalation of the trade war with the United States is 
putting increased pressure on the Chinese economy. Due in part to fiscal stimulus 
measures implemented by the Chinese government to combat trade pressure 
and weakening growth, debt accumulation in the economy has also accelerated. 
The IMF forecasts that debt-to-GDP will increase by 10 percentage points in 2019. 
Some forecasters are predicting Chinese growth rates to fall below 6 per cent in 
2020, rates of growth not seen since the early 1990s. 
 
Figure 4 summarises the forecasts for GDP growth of the Euro Area, the US and 
the UK produced by the major institutions of their respective economies. Each 
forecast signals minimum and maximum forecasts with point values identifying 
the median of forecasts. These forecasts suggest a broad-based expectation of a 
moderation in economic growth in 2019. 
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FIGURE 4 REAL GDP, YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH (%) 
  Euro Area      United States       United Kingdom 
  
 
Sources:  FocusEconomics, IMF, OECD, HM Treasury and Federal Reserve. 
 
Developments in oil prices 
Figure 5 displays recent trends in global oil prices. Following a significant fall in oil 
prices in Q4 2018, OPEC – a cartel of oil producing countries – slashed output 
causing prices to increase significantly over the first half 2019. This price inflation 
was reversed somewhat in Q3 2019 as escalating trade tensions between the US 
and China and a general softening in the outlook for many developed economies 
softened the global demand for energy. However, following a missile attack on 
Saudi Arabian oil infrastructure on September 14, oil prices spiked, increasing by 
as much as 20 per cent in a single day. Should the conflict escalate in the coming 
months further increases in prices are likely to occur. From an Irish perspective, 
higher oil prices will increase inflation, putting upward pressure on household 
expenses. 
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FIGURE 5 CRUDE OIL PRICES ($ PER BARREL) 
 
Source:  Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
 
International financial developments 
Due to the small open nature of the Irish economy, fluctuations in international 
financial markets can have a significant impact on the domestic economy. With 
the prospect of recession looming for a number of developed countries, volatility 
has been increasing in global equity markets through 2019, while sovereign and 
corporate bond yields have been driven to record lows. Further slowdowns in 
global growth, escalating international trade tensions and the potential of a hard 
Brexit are likely to lead to further uncertainty in financial markets going forward.  
 
In early August the VIX Volatility Index rose to its highest level since December 
2018. This index, known as the ‘fear gauge of Wall Street’, is derived from 
volatility in the S&P 500 stock index and is a reflection of investor uncertainty 
about future market conditions. The spike in the index followed a statement from 
the Fed that the July interest rate cut was a ‘mid-cycle adjustment’ as opposed to 
the beginning of series of interest rate cuts, and an announcement from the US 
administration of further tariffs on Chinese imports.  
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FIGURE 6 VIX VOLATILITY INDEX (%) 
 
 
Source:  St Louis Fed Database (FRED), from Chicago Board Options Exchange. 
 
In light of the subdued performance of the Eurozone economy and the 
diminished growth expectations globally, the ECB continues to provide stimulus 
through accommodative monetary policy. At its most recent governing council 
meeting, the ECB agreed to re-engage quantitative easing policies and lower the 
deposit rate further into negative territory. The Eonia rate, which is the rate at 
which banks can lend to each other overnight, stood at just above -0.4 per cent in 
August, which is in line with the negative policy rates set by the ECB. The 
loosening of monetary policy by the ECB is a direct result of the poor European 
growth outlook and low inflation expectations.  
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FIGURE 7 EURO OVERNIGHT INDEX AVERAGE, EONIA (%) 
 
 
Source:  European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse. 
 
Government bond yields continue to trend downward as around the world 
central banks provide accommodative monetary policy. Further downward 
pressure is also being exerted on sovereign yields as investor concern about the 
future prospects for the global economy grow, increasing the demand for 
developed country sovereign bonds which are generally considered to be safe 
assets. Ten-year government bond yields for a select group of advanced countries 
are presented in Figure 8. The ten-year yield for both Japan and Germany are 
now both in negative territory while in the UK the yield has fallen below 1 per 
cent. In Ireland the ten-year yield fell to a 0.17 per cent in June, which represents 
a record low rate for the country. This is particularly beneficial for the Irish 
Exchequer as the level of outstanding debt to output is relatively high by 
international standards.  
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FIGURE 8 TEN-YEAR GOVERNMENT BOND YIELDS (%) 
 
 
Source:  St. Louis Fed database (FRED). 
 
The spread between long- and short-term US Treasury yields is commonly used 
by investors and policymakers as an indicator of future recessions. Over the last 
half century every recession in the US has been preceded by an inversion in the 
yield curve, whereby yields on short-term bonds are higher than yields on long-
term bonds, as illustrated in Figure 9. Theory would suggest that long-term bonds 
should have higher yields than short-term bonds due to the maturity premium 
demanded by investors for longer term investments. However, in circumstances 
when investors believe that interest rates in the future will be set lower (i.e. 
during recessions), they may choose to invest in long-term bonds in order to avail 
of the higher prevailing interest rate today. This increases the demand for longer 
term bonds, driving down their yield and conversely reduces the demand for 
shorter term bonds, increasing their yield. Since May 2019 the spread between 
the yield on ten-year Treasury note and a three-month Treasury bill has been 
negative and as of August was its lowest point since March 2007. Though this 
would suggest that there will be a recession in the US within the next six to 18 
months some have argued that the inverted yield curve has lost its predictive 
power somewhat due to the current low yield environment. Given the reliance of 
the Irish economy on global, and in particular US economic activity, any 
slowdown would likely pass-through to domestic economic activity.  
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FIGURE 9 SPREAD BETWEEN TEN-YEAR AND THREE-MONTH TREASURY YIELDS (%) 
 
Source:  St. Louis Fed database (FRED). 
Note: Shaded areas represent periods of recession. 
 
Figure 10 graphs the exchange rate of the euro (EUR) to the US dollar (USD), the 
British pound sterling (GBP), the Swiss franc (CHF) and the Chinese renminbi 
(CNY). These are the currencies of Ireland’s largest trading partners outside the 
Eurozone and their value against EUR impacts on the competitiveness of Irish 
companies in the international market. Since the result of the Brexit referendum 
in June 2016, the EUR/GBP rate has appreciated significantly. As the probability of 
a No-Deal Brexit has increased over the past number of months the value of the 
EUR against GBP has strengthened even further and as of August it is at the 
highest rate since the financial crisis. Further developments in the Brexit saga 
over the coming months will go a long way in determining the future exchange 
rate, with some analysts predicting parity between both currencies in the event 
of a ‘No-Deal’. While the increased possibility of a No-Deal Brexit has led to an 
increase in the EUR/GBP rate, the exposure of the European market to a 
disorderly Brexit has likely contributed to a weakening of the EUR against USD. 
Coupled with the relatively weak economic performance in the Eurozone versus 
the United States, the EUR/USD rate has been weakening since the first quarter 
of 2018. Meanwhile, the devaluation of the CNY in August has resulted in an 
appreciation of the EUR/CNY rate. 
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FIGURE 10 EUR EXCHANGE RATE TO GBP, CHF, CNY, USD (JANUARY 2016 BASE=100)  
 
 
Source: Eurostat.   
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR IRISH EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
Goods  
The latest quarterly National Account figures show that the traded goods sector 
continues to be a strong source of growth for the Irish economy. In Q1 2019 the 
annual growth rate for Irish goods exports was 14.3 per cent compared to  
10.9 per cent for Irish goods imports. In level terms, the volume of goods 
exported in Q1 2019 was well over double that of goods imported. However, the 
overall trade figures may not paint an accurate picture of the underlying trends in 
goods trade. In order to examine the underlying trend it is important to assess 
developments in cross-border trade.  
 
Cross-border trade excludes the trade of ownership goods (e.g. contract 
manufacturing, merchanting)2 hence the final growth rates for quarterly National 
Account goods trade will differ upon release. While these traded goods are 
owned by Irish resident firms, some of these goods may never physically cross the 
Irish border nor are they produced domestically. Cross-border trade therefore 
 
                                                          
 
2  ‘Goods for processing’ is dominated by ‘contract manufacturing’, a process in which multinational companies residing 
in Ireland issue contracts to foreign firms to produce goods. Although these goods never enter the Irish economy, 
due to ownership of these goods pertaining to Irish resident firms, sales are recorded as an Irish export. 
‘Merchanting’ consists of the buying and selling of completed goods abroad which at no stage enter or leave Ireland.  
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functions somewhat more accurately as an indicator of domestic exporter 
performance.3 In Q2 2019 cross border exports increased by 8.3 per cent on the 
same period the previous year while growth in cross border imports was flat. This 
resulted in an annual increase in the trade balance of €2.9 billion. 
 
FIGURE 11 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE IN CROSS-BORDER IRISH EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, 
(SEASONALLY ADJUSTED) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Due to the exposure of the domestic agricultural sector to Brexit, it is important 
to track developments in Irish food exports. Figure 12 shows how the growth rate 
for food exports and two of its major subcomponents has changed over time. The 
annual growth rate of total food exports decreased slightly to 3.5 per cent in  
Q2 2019. This was driven by a sizeable drop in the growth rate of dairy products 
and eggs which fell from 16.6 per cent in Q1 2019 down to 7.2 per cent in  
Q2 2019.  
 
                                                          
 
3  For further details on ownership trade, see CSO document ‘Explaining Goods Exports and Imports 2012-2016’. 
-2,400
-1,600
-800
 -
 800
 1,600
 2,400
 3,200
 4,000
 4,800
 5,600
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2014Q1 2014Q4 2015Q3 2016Q2 2017Q1 2017Q4 2018Q3 2019Q2
Exports (%, LHS) Imports (%, LHS) Change in Trade Balance (€M, RHS) 
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  A ut um n 2 01 9  |  1 5  
FIGURE 12 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF CROSS-BORDER FOOD EXPORTS (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Services 
As was the case in Q4 2018, service imports continued to grow at a faster pace 
than service exports in Q1 2019. Relative to the same period last year, imports of 
services increased by 19.7 per cent while exports of services increased by  
17.1 per cent. This resulted in a worsening of the services trade balance which 
declined by over €1 billion in the year to Q1 2019.  
 
FIGURE 13 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE IN IRISH SERVICE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
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It is evident from Figure 14 that over the last decade computer services exports 
have been growing rapidly. Exports of computer services accounted for 48 per 
cent of total service exports in Q1 2019 which was a slight increase on its share of 
total service exports in the same period last year. At 21 per cent, business 
services make up the second largest share of total service exports while 
royalties/licences account for about 4 per cent.  
 
FIGURE 14 EXPORTS OF SERVICES BY COMPONENT (€ MILLION) 
  
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Figure 15 highlights how volatile imports of research and development are over 
time and the knock-on effect this has on imports of business services. Business 
services accounted for 33 per cent of all service imports in Q1 2019, down from 
44 per cent in the previous quarter. R&D, which is a component of business 
services, made up 8 per cent of total service imports in Q1 2019 down from  
18 per cent in the previous quarter. The volatile nature of R&D imports, which is 
influenced by a small number of multinational corporations, can have a large 
impact on the overall level of imports and is one of the main causes of distortion 
in the Irish National Accounts.  
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FIGURE 15 IMPORTS OF SERVICES BY COMPONENT (€ MILLION) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Current Account 
The Irish current account balance decreased to approximately €11 billion in  
Q1 2019 compared to €11.3 billion in the same period the previous year. This was 
primarily due to a worsening situation in the balance of primary income and 
services trade. This was offset somewhat by an increase of €300 million in the 
surplus of merchandise trade over the same period.  
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FIGURE 16 CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (€ MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
In light of the well-publicised distortionary effects a small number of 
multinational firms have had on the Irish current account, the CSO produces a 
modified version of the current account on an annual basis. The purpose of the 
modified current account is to exclude transactions that have little tangible 
impact on the Irish economy and in turn to give a better understanding of the 
underlying trends in the resources generated in the domestic economy. In order 
to accomplish this, transactions relating to intellectual property, aircraft leasing 
and the related depreciation are excluded. The current account, the modified 
current account and the items causing distortion which are excluded from the 
modified current account are displayed in Figure 17. The current account and 
modified current account were both very similar until 2014 when the impact of 
R&D, intellectual property and aircraft related to leasing were not that significant. 
However, from 2015 onwards the size of these items, most notably depreciation 
on R&D imports and R&D related IP imports, began to increase significantly. In 
2018 the modified current account balance stood at nearly €13 billion which was 
62.3 per cent less than the headline current account figure. 
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FIGURE 17 MODIFIED CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (€ MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Exports are expected to grow by 8.8 per cent this year and then moderate to 6.3 
per cent in 2020 due to the general consensus of a global economic slowdown 
next year. As a result of distortions from multinational activity we expect imports 
to increase by 20.3 per cent in 2019 and then to moderate to 8.0 per cent in 
2020. 
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The Domestic Economy 
 
Output 
The domestic section of the Commentary is organised as follows; we initially 
review the outlook for output growth before discussing developments in the Irish 
monetary and financial sectors. Prices and earnings in the economy are then 
discussed, followed by a review of demand-side factors such as consumption and 
housing market issues. On the supply side, we then examine developments in 
investment and the labour market before concluding with an analysis of the 
public finances.  
 
The CSO recently released its second ‘Productivity in Ireland’ publication which 
examines productivity in the Irish economy over the past 20 years. Changes in 
productivity are typically measured in terms of changes in gross value 
added. Additionally, productivity is also examined in terms of changes to gross 
output using the KLEMS approach,4 which draws heavily on historic ‘Supply and 
Use’ tables. 
 
Over the period 2000 to 2017, gross value added in the Irish economy increased 
on an annual average basis by 5.2 per cent. Figure 18 summarises the 
contributions from different sectors. On a sectoral basis, 2.3 per cent of GVA 
growth was accounted for by Manufacturing. The second largest contributor to 
growth was the Professional, administrative and support services sector 
contributing 0.8 per cent to the GVA growth. Information and communication 
was third with a contribution of 0.7 per cent to GVA growth. Construction, which 
experienced significant volatility over the period, was the fourth largest 
contributing sector with a 0.1 per cent contribution to growth.  
 
 
                                                          
 
4  The KLEMS approach is used to measure changes in productivity based on changes in gross output. Both the factor 
inputs of capital (K) and labour (L) are measured as well as the intermediate inputs of energy (E), material (M) and 
services (S).  
For more see on this approach see: Jäger, K. (2016). ‘EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts 2016 Release, 
Statistical Module’. Description of Methodology and Country Notes for Spain. 
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FIGURE 18 SOURCES OF OUTPUT GROWTH FOR THE IRISH ECONOMY, 2000-2017 (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Labour productivity in the Irish economy increased on an annual average by  
3.9 per cent over the period (see Figure 19). There was a gradual downward trend 
in labour productivity from 2000 to 2008; however after the financial crisis, there 
was a significant increase in labour productivity, mainly due to the fall in 
employment in the Construction and real estate, Transport and distribution, and 
Hotels and restaurants sectors. Initially, after the 2008 crisis, employers appeared 
to engage in labour hoarding, however there then followed a period of significant 
lay-offs particularly in the Construction sector. The extreme globalisation-related 
events of 2015 did result in a sharp increase in Irish labour productivity for that 
period. 
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FIGURE 19 GROWTH RATE OF LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY AND HOURS WORKED IN IRELAND, 2000-
2017 (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Given the distortionary impact a small number of multinational corporations had 
on the Irish economy in 2015, in Figure 20 the annual average productivity rate is 
broken down for both the Irish domestic and foreign sectors and compared with 
other European countries. This provides a better understanding of the underlying 
level of productivity in the Irish economy. For Ireland as a whole, the average 
productivity rate was 3.9 per cent, compared with 1.25 per cent for the EU 28. 
However, the labour productivity rate for the domestic and other sector in 
Ireland was 2.3 per cent. 
 
FIGURE 20 LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY ANNUAL AVERAGE GROWTH RATE 2000 TO 2017 (%) 
 
 
Source: Eurostat.   
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The CSO recently also released a breakdown for gross value added (GVA) 
between the foreign (MNE) and domestic owned sectors (non-MNE) of the 
economy over the period 2013-2018. GVA at constant (2017) basic prices for the 
non-MNE dominated sectors of the economy increased by 3.9 per cent between 
2017 and 2018. For the same period, the MNE sector increased by 13.9 per cent. 
Overall, GVA as a whole increased by 7.9 per cent. Table 1 summarises the 
increases in the MNE and non-MNE sectors over the period 2013 and 2018. For 
2015, it is evident that when GVA growth was 26 per cent, the non-MNE sector 
still grew by 6.6 per cent. 
 
TABLE 1 GROWTH RATE OF GROSS VALUE ADDED AT CONSTANT PRICES 2013 – 2018 (%) 
  2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
  Growth (%) 
Foreign-owned MNE dominated -1.3 11.6 82.8 6.2 10.3 13.9 
Other 2.5 6.0 6.6 3.6 4.8 3.9 
Total 1.6 7.3 25.9 4.7 7.0 7.9 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office. 
 
For 2019 our baseline headline GDP growth rate has been revised upwards to  
4.9 per cent with output expected to grow by 3.1 per cent in 2020. However, this 
revision reflects more the likely impact of certain multinational-related 
transactions than any increase in underlying domestic economic activity. 
Furthermore, if a No-Deal Brexit were to occur in late 2019 we believe the 
economy might only grow by 1 per cent in 2020.  
 
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL AND INFLATION OUTLOOK 
Household credit and mortgage market 
While credit flows play an important role in allowing households to optimise their 
consumption patterns, they must be monitored closely as the build-up of large 
levels of credit can be detrimental to the financial stability of an economy.  
Figure 21 presents the annual growth rates of credit to households from Irish 
resident credit institutions.5 The data are split by loans for house purchase and 
other personal loans (auto finance, credit cards, student loans etc.). The growth 
rate in lending for house purchase was relatively modest at 1.4 per cent in  
Q1 2019 while credit growth for other personal loans continued to expand over 
the same period and now stands at 4.6 per cent on an annual basis. These rates 
 
                                                          
 
5  See CBI, ‘Credit, Money and Banking Statistics: Private Household Credit and Deposits’ A.18 for details. 
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remain significantly below the levels they were at before the financial crisis when 
credit growth in some quarters was in excess of 30 per cent. 
 
FIGURE 21 GROWTH RATES OF CREDIT TO HOUSEHOLDS (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Credit, Money and Banking Statistics.  
Notes:  Data are taken from Central Bank of Ireland data release A.18, Growth rates series codes 777 and 1,252.  
 
While the growth rate of new mortgage lending has been declining since  
Q2 2017, both the increase in the volume and value of drawdowns remains 
strong at 8.8 and 11.7 per cent respectively (Figure 22). In level terms the number 
of new mortgage transactions in Q2 2019 stood at just over 10,000 which is the 
highest number of drawdowns in the second quarter of a year since 2009. A 
moderation in the growth rate of mortgage credit is not unexpected given the 
high growth rates in 2017 as the market recovered. Furthermore, recent 
increases in house prices may present an affordability challenge for households 
looking to borrow within the current regulatory framework, particularly in urban 
areas. This is likely to dampen the growth in new mortgage lending.  
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FIGURE 22 TOTAL NEW MORTGAGE LENDING (%) 
 
 
Source:  Banking and Payments Federation Ireland. 
 
The payment arrears rate on mortgages and buy-to-let properties gives an 
indication of the sustainability of lending. The percentage of principal dwelling 
home loans in arrears has declined steadily since 2013, falling from a peak rate of 
12.9 per cent in Q3 2013 to just over 6 per cent in Q1 2019 (Figure 23). Many of 
the loans still in arrears are the very long-term cases. Given the recent economic 
performance, it is unlikely these arrears cases will be cured by economic factors 
and will likely need restructuring or legal solutions to their impairment.  
 
FIGURE 23 IRISH HOUSEHOLD MORTGAGE ACCOUNTS IN ARREARS BY TYPE OF LOAN (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Mortgage Arrears Statistics. 
Notes:  Loans are defined in arrears if they are greater than 90 days past due on their payments.  
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Trends in SME credit market 
The allocation of credit to SMEs is an indicator of the health of the domestic 
economy and banking sector. It provides a gauge of both the willingness of credit 
providers to take on risk and the views of indigenous businesses to the suitability 
of market conditions for future investment. Figure 24 shows that from 2017 
onwards there has been a fall in the growth rate of new lending to SMEs by Irish 
banks. As of Q1 2019 the growth rate of credit has declined to -4.1 per cent year-
on-year. Given the robust performance of the economy over this period, the fall 
in new lending suggests there is increasing uncertainty among SMEs/banks. 
However, it should be noted that this data only contains lending to SMEs by the 
traditional banking sector. A recent report by the OECD has noted that globally 
there has an increase in alternative lending to SMEs through platforms such as 
peer-to-peer lending and hire purchase.6 If SMEs are turning away from 
traditional bank lending towards these alternative methods of financing then 
bank lending may not give a true indication of SME activity. In Ireland, recent 
research has highlighted that many firms have considerable internal funds and 
these are being used to fund investment (Gargan et al., 2018).7 High levels of cash 
stocks are also likely to dampen credit demand. In terms of SME lending by 
sector, from Q1 2018 to Q1 2019 there were significant falls in new lending to 
Business services including ICT and finance (-52.0 per cent), Construction and real 
estate (-41.6 per cent) and Hotels and restaurants (-34.7 per cent). Over the same 
period there was an increase in lending to Wholesale and retail (+5.0 per cent) 
and Primary industries (+2.8 per cent).  
 
 
                                                          
 
6  OECD (2019). Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2019: An OECD Scoreboard, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
7  Gargan, E., M. Lawless, M. Martinez-Cillero and C. O’Toole (2018). ‘Exploring SME investment patterns in Ireland: 
New survey evidence’, Quarterly Economic Commentary: Special Article, Autumn 2018. Economic and Social Research 
Institute. 
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FIGURE 24 NEW LENDING TO SMES BY IRISH BANKS, TOTAL PER ANNUM (€ MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, SME Credit Series, Table A.14.1. 
 
Interest rates and the cost of finance 
Figure 25 shows that the cost of finance for Irish households is relatively high 
compared to other Euro Area countries. This has been the case since 2014 when 
Irish interest rates started to increase despite the fact that they were beginning 
to fall in the Euro Area. As of June 2019 interest rates in Ireland were 2.9 per 
cent, which is over 100 basis points higher than the median rate in the Euro Area. 
Given the affordability issues in the Irish housing market, the comparatively high 
rates of borrowing exacerbate the challenges faced by Irish homeowners relative 
to their European peers.  
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FIGURE 25 INTEREST RATES ON NEW HOUSE PURCHASE LOANS TO HOUSEHOLDS, EURO AREA 
COMPARISON (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, SME Credit Series, Table A.14.1. 
Notes:  Countries included are: AT, BE, EE, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LT, NL, PT, SI. These countries are selected due to data availability. Data 
differ between this chart presented and the text as the ECB comparison data include restructured mortgages whereas the 
new business SVR is only for new drawdowns. 
 
Similar to interest rates on mortgages, interest rates on corporate loans in Ireland 
are also high relative to other Euro Area countries. Figure 26 presents the interest 
rates on new business loans for Non-Financial Corporations in Ireland as well as 
the median rate for the Eurozone. Two series are shown: 1) covering all loans and 
2) covering loans worth less than €250,000, the latter of which is used as a proxy 
for loans to SMEs. In June 2019 the average interest rate for all loans in Ireland 
was 2.6 per cent compared to just 1.6 per cent in the Euro Area. The difference 
was even greater for small loans which had an average interest rate of 5.3 per 
cent in Ireland and 2.2 per cent in the Euro Area. 
 
Given the common monetary policy across Euro Area countries, the relatively 
high interest rates faced by Irish consumers and businesses may be explained by 
structural dissimilarities in the banking system. These include differences in risk 
appetites and regulatory differences, particularly with regard to repossessions. 
Another commonly cited reason is the lack of competition among retail banks, 
owing partly to the increased concentration of retail banks in the Irish market 
following the financial crisis.8 
 
 
                                                          
 
8  See: Nevin, C. (2018). ‘Irish retail bank profitability 2003-2018’, Financial Stability Notes, Vol. 2018, No. 10, Central 
Bank of Ireland. 
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FIGURE 26 INTEREST RATES ON NEW CORPORATE LOANS, EURO AREA COMPARISON (%) 
 
 
Source:  ECB MFI data. Small loans refer to loans worth less than €250,000. 
 
Inflation outlook 
Figure 27 presents the inflation rate in Ireland using CPI, the CPI excluding energy 
and unprocessed foods (core inflation), and HICP. Despite an environment of low 
unemployment and increasing earnings, price inflation has been relatively 
subdued in 2019. In July 2019, the 12-month inflation rate was 0.5 per cent for 
both CPI and HICP. Core inflation, which does not include energy prices or 
unprocessed food, was slightly higher at 0.6 per cent over this period. Over the 
same period there were increases in the prices of alcohol and tobacco (+2.5 per 
cent), restaurants and hotels (+2.3 per cent), education (+1.7 per cent), and 
health costs (+0.8 per cent). Elsewhere, sectors which experienced deflation over 
the 12-month period were communications (-6.8 per cent), furnishings, 
household equipment and routine household maintenance (-3.8 per cent), 
clothing and footwear (-1.6 per cent), transport (-1.2 per cent) and food and non-
alcoholic beverages (-0.5 per cent).  
 
Box 1 in the Commentary explores how the strong EUR/GBP rate that has 
prevailed since the Brexit referendum in 2016 may be keeping Irish inflation 
subdued. This phenomenon is known as exchange rate pass-through and is a 
measure of the extent to which cheaper import prices are passed on to 
consumers when the domestic currency increases in value relative to the origin 
country. 
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FIGURE 27 ANNUAL GROWTH IN INFLATION (%)  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The trends in price growth of goods and services have been pulling in opposite 
directions since 2013. Figure 28 shows that while the annual price of services has 
been increasing each month over the past six years, over the same period goods 
prices have generally been falling. It is this deflation in the price of goods that has 
kept the overall inflation rate subdued. There are a number of factors which may 
help explain the difference in price growth between goods and services. These 
include a greater level of competition in the goods sector, which has been 
enhanced by increased globalisation and international trade. There has also been 
a faster rate of growth in labour productivity in manufacturing relative to market 
services over the past number of decades.9  
 
 
                                                          
 
9  For further discussion see Ferrara, L. (2019). ‘What is behind the change in the gap between services price inflation 
and goods price inflation?’, Economic Bulletin, Issue 5, ECB, 2019. 
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FIGURE 28 DECOMPOSITION OF ANNUAL CPI GROWTH INTO GOODS AND SERVICES GROWTH (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
As the economy grows and the labour market continues to tighten, price growth 
is expected to increase over the next two years. Consumer prices are expected to 
rise by 1.1 per cent in 2019, followed by a 1.4 per cent increase in 2020.  
 
BOX 1  EXCHANGE RATE PASS-THROUGH – EUR/GBP 
Following the result of the Brexit referendum on June 24, 2016, the value of the euro 
(EUR) rose significantly against the British pound sterling (GBP). While on June 23, the 
EUR/GBP rate was 0.77, by June 27 (the first full trading day after the result) it had 
appreciated to 0.83. As of July 2019 the rate has risen to 0.90, 16 per cent higher than it 
had been on the day of the referendum.  
Goods from the UK make up over 20 per cent of the total value of Irish goods imports 
and an appreciation in the EUR/GBP rate, which makes these imports cheaper, is likely to 
impact the overall rate of Irish inflation. The extent to which fluctuations in foreign 
exchange rates impact on consumer prices is known as exchange rate pass-through 
(ERPT). 
There are two channels through which ERPT can impact the price levels of consumer 
goods and services, directly and indirectly. (i) When the value of the domestic currency 
appreciates (depreciates) against the origin country the price of imported final consumer 
goods will become less (more) expensive. (ii) The fall (rise) in the price of imported goods  
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for the production process due to an appreciation (depreciation) of the domestic 
currency. This results in a fall (rise) in cost to domestic producers, some of which may be 
passed on to consumers in the form of cheaper (more expensive) products/services.  
In order to see how fluctuations in the EUR/GBP exchange rate impact on Irish inflation 
we estimate the exchange rate pass-through using monthly data from January 2000 to 
April 2019. We use a regression model similar to that implemented in the existing 
literature by Campa and Goldberg (2005) and Gopinath (2015) among others. The model 
is given as:  
∆pt  =  α + ∑ βk∆ft−k  +  γ∆Xt +  εt 𝑇𝑘=0   
where ∆pt is the monthly log change in the Irish Consumer Price Index (CPI), ∆ft−k is the 
monthly log change of the EUR/GBP exchange rate in period t-k. The control variables 
∆Xt include both the monthly log change in the UK’s producer price index and the 
monthly log change in the average earnings for UK workers. Together these variables are 
used as a proxy for the production costs faced by UK exporters. As these variables could 
be correlated with the exchange rate, omitting them could bias the coefficient on the 
variable of interest. The model was estimated using OLS after conducting stationarity 
checks on each variable.10 The initial estimation includes no lags and estimates the 
contemporaneous level of pass-through each month. As the transmission of exchange 
rates to prices can take a number of periods before the full effect is realised, we also 
estimate the model including lags of three and 12 months respectively, as per Campa and 
Goldberg (2005). The ERPT is thus the sum of the coefficients on all lags, the results of 
which are presented in Table A.  
TABLE A REGRESSION ESTIMATE RESULTS 
Dependent Variable ∆𝐩𝐭 
 Coefficient P>|t| 
ERPT (0 Lags) -0.031 0.061 
ERPT (3 Lags) -0.114 0.000 
ERPT (12 Lags) -0.185 0.009 
 
Source:  QEC Authors’ Analysis. 
The negative sign on the coefficients is as expected given the underlying theory that an 
appreciation in the domestic currency relative to the origin country should result in a fall 
in inflation in the domestic economy. The interpretation of this coefficient is that a  
10 per cent appreciation in the EUR/GBP rate yields a 1.1 and 1.9 per cent decrease in  
 
 
                                                          
 
10  We ran a Dickey Fuller test on all of the time series in order to test for a unit root. We find there to be a trend in all 
series and conclude that they are non-stationary. By taking the first differences both series are made stationary and 
we conclude they are all integrated of order 1. In order to test for cointegration we use the Engle Granger test and 
fail to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration.   
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Irish CPI in the short and long run respectively. These results are statistically significant at 
the 1 per cent level. A similar study by Rice and Reddan (2017) using VAR methodology 
found ERPT from a 10 per cent change in the EUR/GBP rate to be about 1.5 per cent for 
Irish inflation over 12 months. 
Given the strong value of the euro relative to sterling over the past three years, these 
results suggest that Irish inflation has been subdued relative to what it may have been 
had the UK not voted to leave the EU. In order to illustrate this we use the long-run result 
in Table A to provide a counterfactual of Irish CPI under a number of different historical 
and hypothetical exchange rate scenarios. The results of this experiment are presented in 
Table B. All else being equal, the Irish CPI would be 2.5 per cent higher than its actual 
level in July 2019 if the pre-Brexit exchange rate prevailed. If the strong sterling seen pre-
financial crisis still prevailed then CPI would be 4.9 per cent higher, while if there was 
parity between the two currencies then the CPI would be 2.1 per cent lower. 
This result has implications going forward as the outcome of Brexit is likely to have a 
significant bearing on the future direction of the EUR/GBP rate which, as we have shown, 
will have a considerable impact on Irish inflation.11 
TABLE B SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
  EUR/GBP Rate CPI (base Dec 2011 = 100) 
Current (July 2019) 0.90 103.5 
Pre-Brexit (May 2016) 0.78 106.1 
Pre-Financial Crisis (Jan 2007) 0.66 108.6 
Post-Crisis (Jan 2009) 0.92 103.1 
Parity 1.00 101.4 
 
Source:  Eurostat, QEC Authors’ Analysis. 
 
References: 
Campa, J. and L. Goldberg (2005). ‘Exchange rate pass-through into import prices’, The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(4), 679-690. 
Dornbusch, R. (1987). ‘Exchange rates and prices’, American Economic Review, 77,  
93-106. 
Forbes, K., I. Hjortsoe and T Nenova (2017). ‘Shocks versus structure: explaining 
differences in exchange rate pass-through across countries and time’, Discussion Papers 
50, Monetary Policy Committee Unit, Bank of England. 
 
 
                                                          
 
11  It should be noted that were a ‘No-Deal Brexit’ to materialise there would likely be increased trade costs that would 
be passed on to Irish consumers. Lawless and Morgenroth (2018) estimate that in the event of a No-Deal Brexit, Irish 
CPI could increase by as much as 3.1 per cent due to an increase in tariffs and non-tariff barriers. This is in turn could 
counteract the downward pressure on inflation from an increase in the EUR/GBP rate. 
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This Box was prepared by Matthew Allen-Coghlan. 
 
DEMAND 
Household sector consumption  
According to the latest quarterly National Accounts, personal consumption 
expenditure increased by 3.3 per cent year-on-year in Q1 2019. This represents 
an increase in the pace of growth from Q4 2018 and is at odds with the 
downward trend in consumer sentiment over the same period. The continued 
strong growth in household spending has likely been driven by lower 
unemployment rates and increasing disposable incomes. While uncertainties 
abound internationally, the domestic economic performance in Ireland has 
ensured that many households have experienced improved incomes and better 
labour market outcomes.  
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FIGURE 29  QUARTERLY PERSONAL CONSUMPTION ON GOODS AND SERVICES – CONSTANT 
MARKET PRICES AND SEASONALLY ADJUSTED 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
To get an insight into what is driving household spending patterns we draw on 
the detailed retail sales data. Retail sales is an important input into understanding 
household behaviour as it measures actual spending and is available in a timely 
manner. Table 2 presents the annual growth in retail sales volume for select 
items for the three months to July 2019. The second quarter information on retail 
sales gives a more up-to-date picture than the Q1 National Accounts data.  
 
The retail sales data provide a more subdued picture of housing spending, with 
an actual decline recorded in July year-on-year. Overall retail sales fell by 1.4 per 
cent. This was mainly driven by a pull-back in sales in the motor trade; retail sales 
excluding the motor trade rose modestly at 2.9 per cent. Sales of furniture and 
lighting goods grew considerably, up 13.3 per cent year-on-year, which is likely 
due to the strong growth in housing market activity. However, there was a 4.5 
per cent fall in retail sales from department stores.   
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TABLE 2 GROWTH IN SELECT RETAIL SALES (VOLUME) ITEMS, THREE MONTHS TO JULY 2019 
Retail Business - NACE REV 2 Volume of Sales Annual % change 
Motor trades -8.69 
Non-specialised stores (excluding department stores) 2.73 
Department stores -4.51 
Clothing, footwear and textiles 0.06 
Furniture and lighting 13.25 
All retail businesses -1.43 
All retail businesses, excluding motor trades 2.93 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The overall trends in retail sales are displayed in Figure 30. This chart presents a 
three-month rolling average of annual growth of total retail sales, sales excluding 
the motor trade, and sales for household equipment. While the March and April 
data indicated an acceleration in the trend across all three series, it is clear that, 
throughout the second quarter and into July, the growth rate has fallen back. The 
fall in the growth rate is evident even excluding the motor trade.  
 
FIGURE 30 ANNUAL GROWTH IN RETAIL SALES INDEX, VOLUME ADJUSTED, THREE-MONTH 
ROLLING AVERAGE (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Another important indicator which provides insight into household spending is 
consumer sentiment. Figure 31 presents an index developed using the European 
Commission data on consumer sentiment. The figure presents data for Ireland, 
the UK and the rest of the EU to provide context.  
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FIGURE 31 CONSUMER SENTIMENT INDICATORS – IRELAND, UK AND REST OF EU (JANUARY 
2010 BASE = 100) 
 
 
Source:  European Commission data and ESRI calculation.  
Note: The positive/negative balances from the EU COF series are transformed by adding 100. We then set the base to 100 in 
January 2010 with growth relative to this point i.e. ((Yt/YJan2010) -1)*100.  
 
While the initial Brexit delay from the end of March deadline was associated with 
a bounce in sentiment in April 2019, this has been short-lived. Irish consumer 
sentiment has fallen through the summer months and now stands at its lowest 
level since early 2014. Given the developments in the UK, and the increased 
likelihood of an adverse No-Deal outcome for Brexit discussions at the end of 
October, it appears that Irish households are becoming more pessimistic. This is 
likely to restrain spending and may dampen household’s willingness to make 
investments. Other factors such as broader international uncertainties may also 
be playing a role in lowering households’ spending sentiment. The combination of 
worsening consumer sentiment and softer retail sales growth suggests a 
moderation of consumption spending in the second half of the year is likely. As 
the uncertainty around Brexit continues, it is likely that this weakness will persist.  
 
Property market developments 
Property price growth has continued to decelerate into 2019, following the 
downward trend which began in mid-2018. The rate of growth is currently at its 
lowest point since mid-2013. Figure 32 plots the year-on-year changes in 
residential property prices by property type. In June 2019, the annualised growth 
rate in property prices was 2 per cent, a marked slowdown from the growth rate 
witnessed a year previously of over 11 per cent.  
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FIGURE 32 ANNUAL RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY PRICE GROWTH BY DWELLING (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
In the previous Commentary (Summer 2019), a number of potential factors were 
discussed for this weakening house price growth. These included the increased 
level of housing completions as well as affordability constraints arising from the 
mortgage lending limits of the Central Bank of Ireland. Recent house price data 
suggests a continued moderation in house price growth, albeit at a slower rate of 
change than earlier in 2019. Given the rapid deceleration in prices over the past 
number of months, it is highly plausible that property prices may fall by the end 
of 2019.  
 
Comparing Dublin to the rest of the country (Figure 33), it is clear that the 
moderation in price growth has been more acute in the capital city. Over  
Q2 2019, the price index has remained virtually unchanged relative to the same 
period the previous year. Property price growth in the rest of the country has 
been slowing in a less pronounced manner than in Dublin since the second half of 
2018 and this has continued into 2019. As of June 2019, the year-on-year growth 
rate was 3.9 per cent in the rest of the country, down 13 percentage points since 
June 2018. 
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FIGURE 33 ANNUAL RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY PRICE GROWTH BY REGION (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
While property price growth has clearly moderated, rent levels continue to rise 
across the country. In Q1 2019, the National Rent Index grew by just over 8.3 per 
cent relative to the same period the previous year. This represents an 
acceleration relative to Q4 2018. As well as the national index, the ESRI/RTB 
Rental Index also produces indicators at a regional level, namely for Dublin, the 
Greater Dublin Area (GDA) and outside of the GDA. The indices are presented in 
Figure 34. Rents in Dublin grew by 8.6 per cent year-on-year in Q1 2019, while 
rents in the GDA and outside the GDA grew at 6.4 and 9.6 per cent respectively 
over the same period. Increases in the rent level across the country are expected 
to continue as the level of housing supply fails to meet the country’s structural 
demand. 
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FIGURE 34 RTB RENT INDEX – NATIONAL, DUBLIN, GDA AND OUTSIDE OF GDA (%) 
 
 
Source:  Residential Tenancies Board (RTB). 
 
SUPPLY 
Investment 
Given its irreversible nature, capital investment is highly affected by uncertainty. 
In our previous Commentary, we noted the strong negative correlation between 
international uncertainty and investment in Ireland. In the current environment, 
with uncertainty elevated, businesses are likely to be limiting their level of capital 
spending.  
 
For the latest quarterly data available, Q1 2019, total gross fixed capital 
investment stood at €15.5 billion (Figure 35). This is down on the previous 
quarter but above the level from the same period the previous year.  
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FIGURE 35 GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION (€ MILLION) 
 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and QEC analysis.  
 
The growth rate of investment (year-on-year) is presented in Figure 36. Overall, 
investment grew by 5 per cent in Q1 2019. This is considerably lower than the 
growth rate of 67 per cent seen in Q4 2018 and 42 per cent in Q3 2018. This 
series displays considerable volatility reflecting multinational activity in 
machinery and equipment and intangible assets. Building and construction 
activity, which is not distorted by multinationals, grew by 8 per cent year-on-year 
to Q1 2019, 2 percentage points higher than Q4 2018. Investment in machinery 
and equipment fell by 8 per cent year-on-year in Q1 2019, down from 55 per cent 
in Q4 2018.  
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FIGURE 36 GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION GROWTH, YEAR-ON-YEAR (%) 
 
Sources:  CSO and QEC analysis.  
 
Given the distortions from multinational activity in particular asset classes, it is 
informative to review the CSO’s modified Gross Fixed Capital Formation, which 
adjusts for the effects of trade in aircraft by aircraft leasing companies and the 
importation of intellectual property. The adjusted figures overall and for building 
and construction, intangibles and machinery and equipment are presented in 
Figure 37. It can be seen that the adjusted data display a much smoother growth 
pattern with an upward trend evident from mid-2015 onwards. In the most 
recent period (Q1 2019), overall modified investment fell to €9.165 billion, down 
from over €10 billion in the previous quarter. The difference between total and 
modified investment is approximately €6 billion which highlights the scale of the 
distortionary investment by multinationals.  
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FIGURE 37 MODIFIED GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION  (€ MILLION) 
 
 
Sources:  CSO and QEC analysis.  
 
The trend in the year on-year growth rate of modified investment is presented in 
Figure 38. The overall fall in investment was 4 per cent in the year to Q1 2019. 
Underneath the headline figure, there was an 8 per cent increase in both 
intangibles and building and construction. Machinery and equipment investment 
declined by 22 per cent on a year-on-year basis to Q1 2019. Our previous 
Commentary noted that machinery and equipment is very sensitive to 
uncertainty. Given the ongoing developments in relation to Brexit as well as the 
developments with the US-China trade dispute, it is likely that the slowdown in 
machinery and equipment is linked to a hesitancy amongst companies to invest 
until the parameters governing the future trading environment between the UK 
and EU as well as the US and China become clearer. The deterioration in the 
growth outlook in Europe and the US may also be leading to lower investment.  
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FIGURE 38 MODIFIED GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION GROWTH, YEAR-ON-YEAR (%) 
 
 
Sources:  CSO and QEC analysis.  
 
Business sentiment 
To gain more insight into the degree to which businesses are being affected by 
uncertainty, we draw on the European Commission Business Confidence 
Indicators. The overall confidence indicator for Ireland and the average for the 
European Union are presented in Figure 39. This indicator is the average of the 
positive/negative survey response balance to three sub-questions on the order 
book levels, stock holdings and production expectations over the coming three 
months. Positive numbers indicate that more companies perceive an 
improvement in conditions while negative numbers indicate a worsening in the 
economic outlook. While Ireland posts more favourable conditions than the EU 
average, it is clear that since December 2018 there has been a reduction in the 
number of companies viewing the outlook positively. This has occurred 
concurrently with a similar trend for the EU as a whole. It is likely that such a 
reduction in confidence is weighing on investment spending.  
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FIGURE 39 EUROPEAN COMMISSION BUSINESS CONFIDENCE INDICATOR 
 
Source:  European Commission.  
 
A more granular review of the specific concerns of companies can be gleaned 
from considering the sub-indices which are built into the overall confidence 
indicator. Figure 40 presents the trend in the sub-indices covering the following 
issues; production trends, assessment of the order book levels, assessment of the 
export order book levels, production expectations, and employment 
expectations. The interpretation of these indicators is identical to that for the 
headline metric. Since April 2019, production expectations have softened as have 
views on the strength of order books (overall and export). As the trend in current 
production has been more stable, this likely reflects the fact that firms are 
factoring uncertainty into their future projections which is leading to a reduction 
or postponement of certain investment.  
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FIGURE 40 ROLLING AVERAGE FOR INDIVIDUAL ITEMS FROM EUROPEAN COMMISSION BUSINESS 
SENTIMENT FOR IRELAND  
 
Source:  QEC analysis of European Commission data.  
 
Construction outlook 
Construction sector investment has grown strongly in recent years with growth 
rates of over 20 per cent per annum through 2016 and into 2017. However, more 
recently the growth rate has moderated, as noted above. Figure 41 presents the 
trend in housing completions on a quarterly basis over the period Q1 2012 to  
Q2 2019. While completions rapidly increased over the period 2016 and 2017, it 
is clear there has been a slowdown in growth since the start of 2018. Given the 
very high growth rates in the recovery phase (2014-2016), it is not unexpected 
that a moderation would occur.  
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FIGURE 41 HOUSING COMPLETIONS (ESB CONNECTIONS) – QUARTERLY LEVEL AND YEAR-ON-
YEAR GROWTH 
 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
However, the slowdown in the growth rate of completions in Q2 2019, to 12 per 
cent per annum, makes it unlikely that our previous forecast outturn of 23,500 
units for 2019 will be reached. This is despite the expanded commitment by the 
Government to increase the capital spend in housing (particularly related to the 
delivery of social and affordable units). Consequently, we have moderated our 
forecast for 2019 to 21,000 units. Our growth rate for 2020 suggests a 
completions level of just over 25,000 units next year (Figure 42). However, should 
any adverse economic shock occur, for example from a hard Brexit, this may 
further slow completions next year.  
 
FIGURE 42 ANNUAL HOUSING COMPLETIONS (2014-2018 ACTUAL: 2019-2020 FORECASTS) 
 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and QEC Forecasts. 
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Construction forecasts 
As global risk factors and the Brexit negotiations continue to weigh on business 
planning, we have moderated our underlying investment outlook for 2019 and 
2020. However, strong construction activity and increased public investment are 
likely to be key drivers of domestic capital formation, despite the recent noted 
slowdown. Overall we expect annual average growth in investment of 45.1 per 
cent in 2019 due to distortionary multinational activity, falling to 4.6 per cent in 
2020. Given the degree of uncertainty surrounding Brexit, coupled with the 
international slowdown, it is likely that the investment outturn could be much 
weaker than expected.  
 
LABOUR MARKET 
Consistent with the robust performance of the domestic economy, conditions in 
the Irish labour market continue to improve. While the unemployment rate has 
stabilised in 2019, there remains a strong rate of growth in the number of new 
jobs being created. As the competition for labour has intensified, the bargaining 
power of employees has increased and this is reflected in accelerated earnings 
growth. However, the resilience of the labour market is likely to be tested by 
turbulence in the global economy over the coming year with sectors dependent 
on international trade especially vulnerable.  
 
Unemployment 
While the Live Register is not a precise measure of unemployment,12 as it 
includes part-time and some seasonal and casual workers, it is one of the most 
up-to-date and detailed labour market measures. Figure 43 shows that the 
number of people on the Live Register fell to 188,500 in August 2019, 24,400 
(11.9 per cent) less than the same period the previous year. Over this period the 
number of people under the age of 25 declined by 2,900 (12.6 per cent) and now 
stands at 20,200.  
  
 
                                                          
 
12  The Live Register provides a monthly series of the numbers of people registered for Jobseekers Benefit, Jobseekers 
Allowance or other statutory entitlements at the Irish Department of Social Protection. 
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FIGURE 43 NUMBERS ON THE LIVE REGISTER BY AGE (‘000) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Data from the Live Register also indicate there has been a decrease in the 
duration of time people have been out of work. Long-term unemployment is 
defined as being out of work for a period of greater than 12 months and its 
negative consequences for individuals and society have been well documented.13 
The longer a person is unemployed, the more difficult they are likely to find it to 
return to the workforce as a result of deskilling, reduced motivation and 
apprehension from employers about hiring someone who has been out of work 
for a sustained period of time. 
 
Table 3 shows that over the past five years there has been a significant decline in 
both the number and proportion of people who can be considered long-term 
unemployed. As of August 2019 there were 75,800 people who had been on the 
Live Register for a period of greater than a year. This represents 38.1 per cent of 
the total number of people on the Live Register, which is 9 percentage points less 
than the number of people in long-term unemployment in August 2014. Over the 
same period of time there has also been a decline in the number of people in very 
long-term unemployment, with the proportion of people on the Live Register for 
a period of greater than three years decreasing by nearly 5 percentage points to 
21.1 per cent.  
 
                                                          
 
13  Abraham, C.G., K. Sandusky, J. Haltiwanger and J.R. Spletzer (2016). ‘The Consequences of Long Term 
Unemployment: Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data,’ Working Papers 16-40, Center for Economic 
Studies, US Census Bureau;  
O'Connell, P.J., S. McGuinness and E. Kelly (2010). ‘A Statistical Profiling Model of Long-Term Unemployment Risk in 
Ireland’. Working Paper No. 345, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). 
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TABLE 3 NUMBER AND PROPORTION OF PEOPLE ON THE LIVE REGISTER BY DURATION 
  2014 M08 2018 M08 2019 M08 
 (‘000s) % (‘000s) % (‘000s) % 
All durations 398.0  225.2  199.1  
Under 1 year 210.5 52.9 133.2 59.2 123.3 61.9 
1 year and over 187.5 47.1 92.0 40.8 75.8 38.1 
1 year - less than 2 years 51.6 13.0 25.2 11.2 21.3 10.7 
2 years - less than 3 years 32.6 8.2 14.6 6.5 12.5 6.3 
3 years and over 103.3 26.0 52.2 23.2 42.0 21.1 
 
Source:  Live Register, Central Statistics Office. 
 
In February 2019 the seasonally-adjusted rate of unemployment fell to 5.0 per 
cent, which was the lowest rate of unemployment in the country since 
September 2007. More recently the unemployment rate has remained relatively 
flat and as of August stands at 5.2 per cent. As the labour market approaches full 
employment it is unlikely that there will be a further significant decline in the 
unemployment rate such as that consistently witnessed between 2012 and 2019. 
A significant portion of the remaining unemployment is likely to be structural in 
nature meaning that it is independent of the business cycle. 
  
FIGURE 44 SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BY MONTH (%) 
 
 
Source:  Monthly Unemployment Series, Central Statistics Office. 
 
Employment  
There were an additional 44,400 people employed in Q2 2019 in comparison to 
the same period the previous year, an increase of 2.0 per cent. While this marks 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
05
M
08
20
06
M
02
20
06
M
08
20
07
M
02
20
07
M
08
20
08
M
02
20
08
M
08
20
09
M
02
20
09
M
08
20
10
M
02
20
10
M
08
20
11
M
02
20
11
M
08
20
12
M
02
20
12
M
08
20
13
M
02
20
13
M
08
20
14
M
02
20
14
M
08
20
15
M
02
20
15
M
08
20
16
M
02
20
16
M
08
20
17
M
02
20
17
M
08
20
18
M
02
20
18
M
08
20
19
M
02
20
19
M
08
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  A ut um n 2 01 9  |  5 1  
the twenty-eighth straight quarter in which annual employment growth has been 
positive it is also the lowest rate of growth in over five years. This is likely part of 
a natural decrease in the rate of employment growth as the economy approaches 
full employment and the rapid recovery from the financial and economic crisis 
begins to give way to more normalised growth rates. It may also be partially 
explained by increasing apprehension on the part of employers in the face of ever 
increasing international uncertainty. The number of people working full-time 
increased by 2.2 per cent to 1,838,100 in Q2 2019, and now accounts for 
approximately 80 per cent of the total workforce. The number of people working 
part-time increased by 1.3 per cent to 462,000 over the same period. The number 
of people who are part-time underemployed, which is a measure of those who 
are currently working part-time but have a desire to work more hours, fell by 
over 12 per cent. This suggests that there is an increasing number of people 
moving from part-time to full-time work in the Irish labour force. Labour force 
participation remains static at 73.1 per cent for those aged 15-64.  
 
FIGURE 45  SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED EMPLOYMENT, FULL-TIME AND PART-TIME (‘000S) 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey, Central Statistics Office. 
 
Figure 46 breaks down the growth in the seasonally-adjusted level of 
employment by sector. Over the last ten years the ICT sector has experienced 
significant improvements in employment with nearly 40 per cent more people 
working in the sector in Q2 2019 compared to Q2 2009. There has also been a 
similar improvement in employment in the Accommodation and food service 
sector, likely resulting from an increase in disposable income and tourism to 
Ireland over this period. The nadir of the Construction sector came a number of 
years after the other sectors, bottoming out in 2013. Following that there has 
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been a rapid rise in employment but the sector has shown signs of cooling off 
since the middle of 2018. This is in line with the slowdown in the investment 
witnessed within the construction industry over the same period. Meanwhile, 
employment in the Finance, insurance and real estate sector has remained 
relatively flat over the past decade. The only sector in which there has been a fall 
in employment over this period is in Agriculture. This decline has manifested itself 
since the beginning of 2018 and coincides with the increased uncertainty around 
Brexit. This is unsurprising given the high level of importance that UK trade has 
for the agricultural sector.  
 
FIGURE 46  SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR (Q2 2009 BASE=100) 
 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey, Central Statistics Office 
 
Table 4 presents a comparison of employment rates in Ireland and the EU for  
Q1 2019. While the overall employment rate in Ireland is comparable to the EU 
average, breaking down the figures by gender and age reveal a number of 
differences. The main difference is in the employment rate for those between the 
ages of 15-24 where the Irish rate compares favourably against the EU average. 
The youth employment rate in Ireland is 41.8 per cent which is 6 percentage 
points greater than the EU average. This difference is even greater for female 
youth employment where there is 7.8 percentage point difference between 
Ireland and the EU. 
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TABLE 4  EMPLOYMENT RATES BY GENDER AND EDUCATION Q1 2019 
Gender Age Ireland % 
EU 
% 
Total 
Total (15-64 years) 69.7  69.2  
15-24 years 41.8  35.8  
25-54 years 80.2  81.0  
55-64 years 61.5  59.5  
Male 
Total (15-64 years) 74.8  74.4  
15-24 years 41.8  37.7  
25-54 years 86.4  86.8  
55-64 years 69.6  66.3  
Female 
Total (15-64 years) 64.7  63.9  
15-24 years 41.7  33.9  
25-54 years 74.3  75.2  
55-64 years 53.5  53.2  
 
Source:  Eurostat. 
 
Earnings 
Seasonally-adjusted Average Hourly Earnings increased by a substantial 4.0 per 
cent in Q2 2019 compared to the same period the previous year. This is the 
highest rate of growth in labour earnings since Q1 2009. The average earnings per 
hour now stands at €23.88 while the average earnings per week is €771.23. In 
terms of sectors, the largest increases were observed in Transportation and 
storage up by €1.91 per hour (+8.6 per cent), Arts and entertainment up by €1.53 
per hour (+8.6 per cent) and Administrative and support services up by €1.28 per 
hour (+7.2 per cent). Other notable increases occurred in Wholesale and retail 
(+6.1 per cent), Human health and social work (+4.4 per cent) and 
Accommodation and food services (+4.1 per cent). In both Mining and quarrying 
(-5.3 per cent) and Electricity, water supply and waste management (-1.0 per 
cent) there was a fall in the seasonally-adjusted Average Hourly Earnings over this 
period.  
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FIGURE 47  TRENDS IN AVERAGE EARNINGS PER WEEK AND PER HOUR, SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED 
(€) 
 
 
Source:  Earnings and Labour Costs Quarterly, Central Statistics Office. 
Note:  The y-axis on the LHS scale has a very low range of values.  
 
The extent to which workers benefit from increased earnings is conditional on the 
relative change in consumer prices. While earnings growth has accelerated over 
the past number of years, over this time there has also been an increase in 
inflation. Figure 48 shows the developments in real earnings growth over the last 
decade. In the aftermath of the financial crisis real earnings tumbled, decreasing 
by nearly 4.5 per cent in Q3 2011. Since then there has been a general 
improvement in real earnings as earnings growth has surpassed inflation. In  
Q2 2019 nominal earnings growth reached 3.5 per cent but this was offset 
somewhat by a pick-up in inflation to 1.3 per cent. As the labour market 
continues to tighten earnings growth is expected to improve, but this in turn is 
likely to exert further upward pressure on inflation.  
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FIGURE 48 REAL EARNINGS GROWTH (%) 
 
 
Source:  Eurostat. 
 
Labour market forecasts 
In light of the expected strong growth of the Irish economy in 2019, we expect 
the unemployment rate to average 5.1 per cent in 2019. With growth expected to 
slow the following year in the face of increasing international uncertainty, the 
unemployment rate is expected to improve only slightly, averaging 5.0 per cent in 
2020. Employment levels are expected to average 2.31 million in 2019 and  
2.35 million in 2020. As the supply of labour continues to tighten we forecast 
nominal earnings to grow by 4.2 per cent in 2019 and 4.5 per cent in 2020.  
 
PUBLIC FINANCES 
Despite ongoing concerns about Brexit and the observed slowdown in the 
performance of many key trading partners of the Irish economy, Exchequer 
receipts have shown persistent and strong growth for the year to date in 2019. As 
can be seen from Figure 49, all taxation items with the exception of stamp duties 
have shown significant increases in year-on-year returns. 
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FIGURE 49 ANNUAL CHANGES IN MAJOR TAX SUB COMPONENTS, JANUARY-AUGUST (%) 
 
 
Source:  QEC Calculations. 
 
Income tax receipts, for example, for the year to date are up by 7.9 per cent on 
the previous year, while pay related social insurance receipts are up over 5.5 per 
cent on the previous year. Increases in both these tax receipts along with the 
continued robust performance of the Irish labour market demonstrate the 
underlying resilience of the Irish economy. 
 
Interestingly, corporation tax has also experienced a significant increase for the 
year to date. Typically, during the course of the year, November is the month 
which registers the largest increase in this taxation item, with strong increases 
also observed in May and June. Therefore, the 12.9 per cent increase for the year 
to date suggests that this tax heading may witness another significant increase in 
2019. Corporation tax receipts increased by almost 27 per cent in 2018 prompting 
the Department of Finance to forecast an actual decline in receipts in 2019. The 
better than expected performance for this major taxation item has positive 
implications for the General Government Balance (GGB). Indeed, this increase 
along with the robust performance of the economy is the main reason why we 
have revised our forecast for the GGB to that of a balanced budget for 2019. In 
previous Commentaries we had forecast a deficit of 0.2 per cent of GDP. 
However, as noted in the previous Commentary, it is important to be able to 
distinguish between increases in corporation tax receipts which are due to 
underlying improvements in the profitability of multinationals, and those that are 
due to firm-specific taxation related strategies. Any difference between these 
two levels can be construed as windfall receipts in nature and as such should not 
be used to fund increases in current expenditure. 
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If a balanced budget is to be attained in the current year then improved discipline 
will be required on the expenditure side of the accounts. For the year to date, 
total gross voted expenditure is running almost €260 million below profile.  
Table 5 summarises the differences between the actual and profile performance 
for both current and capital expenditure for the year to date. 
 
TABLE 5 CAPITAL AND CURRENT GROSS VOTED EXPENDITURE – ACTUAL AND PROFILE, 
JANUARY TO AUGUST (€ BILLION) 
 Actual Profile % difference 
Current 38.7 38.8 0 
Capital 3.4 3.5 -3 
Total 42.0 42.3 -1 
 
Source:  Fiscal Monitor, Department of Finance. 
 
However, in terms of discipline on the expenditure side, the Governments mid-
year expenditure report (MYER) published by the Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform  makes some interesting observations. For example, 
voted expenditure for the Health sector has increased from €13.4 billion in 2013 
to €16.8 billion in 2018 with a further increase of circa €1.1 billion in the Voted 
Health allocation in 2019. The main reasons outlined by the MYER include 
demographic factors, with the population increasing by 0.32 million during this 
period and the increase in HSE staffing numbers by over 20,000 FTE (20 per cent) 
between 2014 and 2018. 
 
Furthermore, the MYER highlights the tendency for expenditure in Health to 
increase in the second half of the year and particularly in the final quarter. In the 
present year, the MYER notes that  
it is concerning that only 2 per cent of the additional €0.9 billion 
allocated to day to day health expenditure this year has been 
allocated to the final three months of 2019. Indeed, the Department 
are only projecting that Quarter 4 expenditure in 2019 will be  
€18 million higher than same quarter in 2018, an optimistic position 
given the trend in the year to date.  
 
Past trends therefore would suggest that the profile level of expenditure for 
health in the current year is likely to be exceeded. An increasing focus should be 
placed on the development of accurate spending projections for the health 
budget. Better forward planning can ensure fewer unexpected overruns and 
improve the ability to manage the overall public finances. These measures should 
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go hand in hand with measures to improve the efficiency of health spending. 
Recent research by Keegan et al. (2018)14 aims to address this important issue. 
 
The Summer Economic Statement (SES) released by the Department of Finance 
outlines the fiscal strategy for Budget 2020. In light of the ongoing uncertainty 
about Brexit, two budgetary scenarios were outlined. ‘Scenario A’ involves an 
orderly exit at end of 2020, while ‘Scenario B’ involves a disorderly exit at the end 
of October 2019.  
 
Under Scenario A, a headline surplus of 0.4 per cent of GDP is anticipated for 
2020. This, based on the forecasts in the SES, would involve a budgetary package 
of €2.8 billion of which €1.9 billion has already been pre-committed with an 
additional 0.2 billion being used as an expenditure reserve. 
 
Under a disorderly Brexit (Scenario B), which now appears to be the most likely 
option, all of the pre-committed expenditure outlined in Scenario A will also be 
committed. However, this scenario will also provide temporary targeted funding 
for the sectors most impacted by Brexit – Agriculture and Enterprise. Additional 
expenditure will also be required under Scenario B in Social Protection given the 
anticipated increase in unemployment likely to occur. Under this scenario, a 
deficit of approximately 0.5 per cent to 1.5 per cent of GDP is projected for 2020. 
 
From a funding perspective, the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) 
issued €11.3 billion for the year to date. That leaves a remainder of €14-18 billion 
in expected funding in 2019 to fund 2020 redemptions. Overall, the State’s 
funding position is quite positive given the level of pre-funding and the maturity 
of the existing funding. On a European basis, the State debt has one of the 
longest weighted average maturities at ten years; the NTMA has used the period 
of Quantitative Easing (QE) to lengthen maturities of the debt, lower the interest 
rate costs and repay before time the IMF loans associated with the programme of 
support with the ‘Troika’.15  
 
Under our baseline outlook, and subject to the assumption that actual and profile 
expenditure remain closely correlated for the rest of the year, we now believe 
that the General Government Balance is likely to be in balance in 2019 with the 
 
                                                          
 
14  Keegan C., A. Brick, B. Walsh, A. Bergin, J. Eighan and M.A. Wren (2018). ‘How many beds? Capacity implications of 
hospital care demand projections in the Irish hospital system, 2015-2030’, ESRI Research Bulletin, November. 
15  The ‘Troika’ is the expression commonly used to refer to the three bodies (the European Union (EU), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB)) involved in the programme of support for 
the Irish State, which commenced in October 2010. 
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possibility of a mild surplus in 2020. We summarise the resulting implications for 
our forecasts of the debt-to-output ratios in Figure 50. By the end of 2020, we 
believe the debt-to-GDP ratio will be 54 per cent while debt-to-GNI* will have 
fallen just below 90 per cent. 
 
FIGURE 50  DEBT-TO-GDP AND DEBT-TO-GNI* (%) 
 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
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General Assessment 
 
While the Irish economy continues to demonstrate remarkable resilience, a 
number of significant risks may impact on the outlook in 2020. National Accounts 
data for the year to date indicate that the headline rate of growth is likely to be 
near to 5 per cent for the current year. However, like other years, it is evident 
that certain multinational related transactions are likely to see a significant 
divergence between the headline and underlying rate of growth in the economy. 
Indeed, while we have revised upwards our forecast of headline growth for the 
current year, certain underlying variables such as consumption and modified 
investment would indicate that the underlying rate of growth in the economy has 
slowed through the year.  
 
The outlook for 2020 is somewhat less benign; a number of key trading partners 
are experiencing notable reductions in growth with global uncertainty 
exacerbated by ongoing trading tensions between the United States and China. 
Consequently our forecast of economic activity for 2020 has deteriorated with 
the economy expected to grow by 3.1 per cent compared to an expected increase 
of 3.2 per cent in the previous Commentary. 
 
As with all the forecasts in the Commentary, this is subject to the technical 
assumption that the UK will retain the current trading relationship with the 
European Union. We still believe that, were the UK to leave the EU with 
significant disruptions, then the economy would only grow by 1 per cent in 2020. 
However, were the trade disruptions and other aspects (such as financial market 
stress and significant delays at both ports and airports) of a ‘No-Deal’ to be 
particularly severe, it is not inconceivable that the economy could contract in 
2020. It is also important to acknowledge that even under the baseline outlook, 
as long as the Brexit issue remains unresolved, it will continue to have a 
contractionary impact on Irish economic activity by lowering firm investment and 
household spending relative to what it would be if the Brexit issue were not 
relevant. The improved growth outlook along with the continued increase in 
corporation tax returns now means that a balanced budget is a possibility in 
2019. 
 
The framing of budgetary policy for the Irish economy is particularly difficult and 
complex for the forthcoming year. The proposed exit by the United Kingdom from 
the European Union by October 31 poses a significant challenge on this front. On 
the face of it, the Irish economy, as discussed at some length in the previous 
Commentary, is showing some signs of overheating with wage pressures in 
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  A ut um n 2 01 9  |  6 1  
particular continuing to grow as the unemployment rate hovers around the 5 per 
cent rate. Under the baseline outlook, the enhanced outlook of the economy 
coupled with the continued robustness of key labour market indicators suggests 
that a contractionary budget, which aims to take some money out of the 
economy, is the most prudent outcome at this stage. However, the possibility of 
an adverse outcome due to a No-Deal Brexit, along with the observed slowdown 
in the economies of our major trading partners, constitute significant downside 
risks to the present outlook. 
 
Furthermore, domestic policymakers must be alert to the possibility of a 
significant positive shock for the domestic economy if the Brexit issue is resolved 
in a satisfactory manner from an Irish perspective. For example, if the UK were to 
remain in the European Union or if a very benign Withdrawal Agreement were 
passed in the UK parliament, it is quite possible that there could be a significant, 
stimulatory impact on the Irish economy. One possible avenue for this to occur is 
through an inflation channel as examined in the box in the Commentary by Allen-
Coghlan. The box examines the extent to which the recent decline in the value of 
sterling vis-à-vis the euro has helped to keep inflationary pressures somewhat 
subdued in the domestic economy. However, were sterling to appreciate 
suddenly, then it is likely that inflationary pressures could grow quite rapidly and 
in a persistent fashion in the Irish economy. A successful resolution of the Brexit 
issue could also have a positive impact on investment decisions in the domestic 
economy with some evidence suggesting, for example, that uncertainty due to 
Brexit has led to a number of domestic investment decisions being postponed. 
Furthermore, while consumption amongst Irish households has increased quite 
strongly in recent years, it is evident that Brexit-related uncertainty has, over the 
past ten months, caused a deterioration in consumer sentiment and expectations 
about future economic prospects. A sudden improvement in consumer sentiment 
would likely cause a further increase in consumer related behaviour. Finally, an 
increase in the value of sterling would also improve the competitiveness of Irish 
goods and services exported to the UK market.  
 
All of this suggests that, over the next year, the most effective and appropriate 
fiscal policy employed by domestic policymakers may range from a stimulatory 
budget where a disruptive Brexit has had a significant adverse shock, to a 
contractionary budgetary position in the case where the domestic outlook 
continues to progress robustly. 
 
In light of the difficulties surrounding the most appropriate fiscal policy stance, it 
is useful to summarise the choices confronting policymakers as follows: 
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   Government policy 
    
Stimulatory Contractionary 
Performance 
of Economy 
Above trend X  
Below trend  X 
 
From the matrix, the two optimal policy outcomes are where Government policy 
is contractionary when the economy performs above trend and, conversely, 
Government policy is mildly expansionary when the economy is operating below 
trend. The two possible adverse outcomes are where  
1. the Government (in anticipation say of a crash-out Brexit) implements a 
stimulatory budget when the economy actually continues to perform above 
trend (the Brexit issue is possibly resolved and does not materialise); or  
2. where the Government implements a contractionary policy and an 
unexpected (Brexit-related) shock causes the economy to experience a 
significant slowdown.  
 
A key question is which adverse outcome is more significant for the Irish 
economy, particularly in the short run? Clearly, budgetary policy will have to be 
informed by some forecast of political developments in the UK; however, given 
the magnitude of potential Brexit-related impacts on the domestic economy, it 
may be necessary to consider the possibility of a supplementary budget in early 
2020. 
 
In the present Commentary, we have revised downwards our forecast for housing 
completions in 2019 to 21,500 units. We had expected earlier in the year that 
completions would reach 23,500 units. This apparent slowdown in housing 
construction is somewhat disappointing given the strong underlying structural 
demand for housing in the economy. A number of reasons have been offered for 
the slowdown including the moderation in the rate of house price inflation 
resulting in a slowing level of output in the construction sector as well as 
uncertainty due to Brexit. The observed slowdown in house price inflation is 
almost certainly due to affordability pressures, with the continued house price 
increases observed over the past few years eventually curtailing effective 
demand in the Irish residential market. Furthermore, the adoption and 
maintenance of macro-prudential regulations by the Central Bank of Ireland has 
prevented a house price-mortgage credit loop from emerging, where higher 
house prices result in larger amounts of credit being extended, which, in turn, 
leads to higher house prices. There has been some suggestion that these 
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measures should be relaxed in order to ease the affordability pressures apparent 
in the market. However, this would be a serious mistake and would ultimately 
result in higher house prices along with higher levels of personal and household 
debt. The latter would increase the vulnerability of the Irish economy to any 
international shocks or downturns. Ultimately, a greater level of housing supply is 
required for the given level of house prices. This is particularly the case when one 
observes the recent work by Bricongne et al. (2019),16 which indicates that Irish 
house prices, when adjusting for dwelling size, are amongst the highest in the 
European Union. Increasing supply requires that the cost of producing a house in 
the Irish market needs to be reduced. In particular, the high price of development 
land needs to be addressed with the introduction of the recent site tax a 
welcome but preliminary first step.  
 
 
 
  
 
                                                          
 
16  Bricongne J.C., A. Turrini and P. Pontuch (2019). ‘Assessing house prices: Insights from “Houselev” a dataset of price 
level estimates’, European Commission Discussion paper 101, July. 
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 DETAILED FORECAST TABLES 
 
 
 
 FORECAST TABLE A1 EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
 
2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 % change in 2020 2020 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 192.9 8.0 13.8 208.2 8.4 7.0 225.7 6.6 5.0 240.6 
Tourism 5.0 5.3 3.5 5.2 4.0 4.0 5.4 3.6 3.6 5.6 
Other Services 154.7 10.1 5.4 170.3 13.7 12.0 193.6 9.3 8.0 211.6 
Exports of Goods and Services 352.6 8.9 8.9 383.8 5.7 4.2 424.8 5.8 4.3 457.8 
FISM Adjustment 7.1     12.6     13.2     14.2 
Adjusted Exports 359.7 8.9 8.9 396.4 5.6 4.2 438.0 5.8 4.3 472.1 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A2 INVESTMENT 
 
2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 % change in 2020 2020 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Housing 5.6 28.0 25.8 7.1 27.1 17.0 9.1 23.1 15.1 11.2 
Other Building 12.7 14.7 7.1 14.6 16.0 12.0 17.0 13.0 9.0 19.2 
Transfer Costs 1.1 24.4 14.0 1.4 17.9 8.0 1.6 17.1 7.0 1.9 
Building and Construction 20.4 18.8 12.5 24.2 19.3 13.2 28.9 16.4 10.8 33.6 
Machinery and Equipment 72.8 -29.1 -30.6 51.7 63.6 59.8 84.5 4.6 2.6 88.4 
Total Investment 93.2 -18.6 -21.1 75.9 49.4 45.1 113.4 7.6 4.6 122.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A3 PERSONAL INCOME 
2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 % change in 2020 2020 
€ bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn 
Agriculture 0.7 1.6 0.0 0.7 2.4 0.0 0.7 1.2 0.0 0.7 
Non-Agricultural 87.4 5.9 5.1 92.6 7.1 6.6 99.2 6.4 6.4 105.5 
Rental Income 10.0 7.6 0.8 10.8 7.8 0.8 11.6 10.0 1.2 12.8 
Other Income 15.7 3.4 0.5 16.3 6.0 1.0 17.2 8.6 1.5 18.7 
Total Income Received 113.9 5.7 6.4 120.4 7.0 8.4 128.8 7.0 9.0 137.8 
Current Transfers 8.6 -2.7 -0.2 8.4 -2.4 -0.2 8.2 -3.2 -0.3 7.9 
Gross Personal Income 122.5 5.1 6.2 128.7 6.4 8.2 136.9 6.4 8.8 145.7 
Taxes on Income and Wealth -22.2 6.1 -1.4 -23.5 5.3 -1.2 -24.8 4.6 -1.1 -25.9
Personal Disposable Income 100.4 4.8 4.8 105.2 6.6 7.0 112.2 6.8 7.6 119.8 
Consumption 93.8 7.2 6.7 100.6 4.5 4.5 105.1 4.3 4.6 109.6 
Personal Savings 11.4 0.8 0.1 11.5 23.5 2.7 14.2 22.7 3.2 17.4 
Savings Ratio 11.2 10.4 12.1 13.9 
Average Personal Tax Rate 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
FORECAST TABLE A4 IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 % change in 2020 2020 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 85.2 15.8 13.0 98.5 15.6 14.0 113.9 13.0 11.0 128.7 
Tourism 5.8 8.8 8.3 6.3 9.6 8.0 6.9 7.8 6.0 7.5 
Other Services 172.2 4.2 3.7 179.5 26.6 25.0 227.3 7.1 5.5 243.4 
Imports of Goods and Services 263.3 8.0 -2.9 284.4 22.4 20.3 348.1 9.0 7.3 379.6 
FISM Adjustment 30.8 4.6 4.1 4.7 
Adjusted Imports 294.0 -1.7 -2.9 289.0 21.9 20.3 352.2 9.1 7.3 384.2 
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FORECAST TABLE A5 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
2017 2018 2019 2020 
€ bn € bn € bn € bn 
Exports of Goods and Services 352.6 383.8 424.8 457.8 
Imports of Goods and Services 263.3 284.4 348.1 379.6 
Net Factor Payments -62.3 -71.0 -77.6 -82.8
Net Transfers -3.1 -5.1 -5.6 -6.2
Balance on Current Account 1.46 29.0 -6.6 -10.6
As a % of GNP 0.6 11.5 -2.4 -3.8
FORECAST TABLE A6 EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT, ANNUAL AVERAGE 
2017 2018 2019 2020 
‘000 ‘000 ‘000 ‘000 
Agriculture 110.4 107.3 103.1 105.0 
Industry 412.1 423.3 432.3 441.5 
Of which: Construction 128.8 143.4 145.1 148.1 
Services 1,664.5 1,719.4 1,767.8 1,806.6 
Total at Work 2,194.2 2,257.6 2,305.0 2,348.2 
Unemployed 157.9 137.5 128.6 123.1 
Labour Force 2,352.3 2,395.2 2,433.6 2,471.3 
Unemployment Rate, % 6.7 5.8 5.1 5.0 
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